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Bell: Death Row

NOTE

McKENZIE v. DAY: IS TWENTY YEARS ON
DEATH ROW CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT?

I. INTRODUCTION
In McKenzie v. Day,l Duncan Peder McKenzie filed a writ
of habeas corpus, claiming that extended incarceration on
death row is so cruel and unusual that it invokes Eighth
Amendment protections. 2 The Ninth Circuit held that
McKenzie was not entitled to a stay of execution pending the
resolution of his claim. 3 The Ninth Circuit relied on his failure
to raise this claim earlier. 4 Further, after only preliminary
consideration, the Ninth Circuit concluded that McKenzie's
claim would not likely succeed if it was litigated further.5
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided that
capital punishment does not violate the Eighth Amendment's
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 6 This note
raises the question whether extended incarceration on death
row invokes the protections of the Eighth Amendment. This
note examines four aspects of this issue. First, it traces the
facts and procedural history of McKenzie. Second, the history of

F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (Opinion by Kozinski, J., joined by Beezer, J.,
Norris, J.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1840 (1995).
at 1463.
at 1462.
at 1464-66.
5. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1462.
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875
(1976).
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cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence is discussed.
Third, it details and analyzes the majority and dissenting
opinions. Finally, it demonstrates that McKenzie is a poorly
reasoned opinion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.

INTRODUCTION

In January of 1975, a jury convicted McKenzie of deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnapping. 7 On March 3, 1975,
the district court of Montana sentenced McKenzie to death. 8
During his incarceration on death row for over two decades, McKenzie filed three petitions for habeas relief.9 In his
third petition, McKenzie claimed that an inordinate delay in
carrying out his death sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.1O McKenzie attributed the delay to actions and errors
committed by the State of Montana. 11 He specifically focused
on two actions taken by the trial judge that raised questions
about whether Montana convicted and sentenced McKenzie in
7. State v. McKenzie, 557 P.2d 1023 (Mont. 1976), vacated sub nom.
McKenzie v. Montana, 433 U.S. 903 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1050 (1980),
reh'g granted sub nom. McKenzie v. Risley, 815 F.2d 1323 (9th. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. McKenzie v. McCormick, 488 U.S. 901 (1988), cert. denied sub
nom. McKenzie v. Day, 115 S. Ct. 916 (1995), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. (1995),
appeal dismissed, 894 P.2d 289 (Mont. 1995), stay denied, 57 F.3d 1461, (9th. Cir.
1995). A person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if the person purposely
causes the death of another human being or the person attempts to commit, commits, or is legally accountable for the commission of a forcible felony and in the
course of the forcible felony the person causes the death of another human being.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1995). A person is guilty of aggravated kidnapping
if he knowingly or purposely and without lawful authority restrains another person
by either secreting or holding him in a place of isolation or by using or threatening to use physical force, with the purpose of inflicting bodily iI\iury. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-303 (1995).
8. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1489. The sentencing judge stated that a primary
motive in handing down the death penalty was that Montana law did not provide
for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Therefore, he feared that if
McKenzie was not sentenced to death, McKenzie would serve only seven or eight
years. [d. at 1471.
9. [d. at 1463.
10. [d.
11. [d. at 1471.
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violation of the U.S. Constitution. 12 First, the judge gave jury
instructions that shifted to McKenzie the burden of proving he
lacked the requisite intent to commit the crime charged. 13
Second, the judge and the prosecutor conferred alone just prior
to McKenzie's capital punishment sentence. 14
B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS - FIRST PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS

McKenzie appealed his conviction to the Montana Supreme Court, claiming that the jury instructions given at trial
violated the United States Constitution. IS He argued that the
jury instructions relieved the state of proving all the elements
of the crime alleged, and unlawfully shifted to McKenzie the
burden of proving he lacked the requisite intent. 16 The Montana Supreme Court rejected McKenzie's arguments and affirmed his conviction. 17
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
subsequently remanded the case to the Montana Supreme
Court for consideration of the jury instructions. IS A year later,
the Montana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the jury instructions and affirmed McKenzie's conviction. 19
The following year, the United States Supreme Court again
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the
case to the Montana Supreme Court to reconsider the constitutionality of the jury instructions. 20 The Montana Supreme
12. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1471.
13. ld.
14. ld. at 1471 (citing McKenzie v. McConnick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1417 (9th Cir.
1994».
15. See id. at 1490 (citing State v. McKenzie, 557 P.2d 1023, 1029 (Mont.
1976».
16. ld. at 1490. The instructions informed the jury that, if they found the
defendant committed the illegal act on the victim, "the law directs you to reason
from such unlawful act that the defendant acted with an unlawful intent."
McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1490 n.1 (quoting McKenzie v. Montana, 449 U.S. 1050,
1051-52 n.1 (1980». At trial, the prosecutor also requested that the jury receive
alternative instructions. ld.
17. ld. at 1490.
18. McKenzie v. Montana, 433 U.S. 905 (1977); see supra note 7.
19. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1490 (citing McKenzie, 581 P.2d at 1205).
20. ld. (citing McKenzie v. Montana, 443 U.S. at 903). In its decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court referred to Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), in which
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Court held that the jury instructions were unconstitutional. 21
However, the Court again affirmed McKenzie's conviction,
finding that any violation of McKenzie's Fourteenth Amendment rights constituted harmless error.22 In 1980, the United
States Supreme Court denied McKenzie's third petition for
certiorari. 23
In 1981, due primarily to Montana's admission that the
jury instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
McKenzie filed a petition in federal court for writ of habeas
corpus. 24 Almost four years later, the district court dismissed
the petition in an unpublished opinion. 25 One year later, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss
the petition. 26
C. Ex PARTE MEETING - SECOND PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS

In 1985, while the first habeas petition was still pending,
McKenzie's attorney discovered that the prosecutor and the
sentencing judge had conferred alone for over forty-five minutes just prior to the judge handing down McKenzie's capital
punishment sentence. 27 Based on this new information,
the Court held unconstitutional the very same jury instructions in question. [d.
The Court reasoned that the instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment
requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. [d. (citing Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524).
21. [d. at 1491 (citing State v. McKenzie, 608 P.2d 428, 457-59 (Mont. 1980».
The Montana Supreme Court found the instructions unconstitutional because they
shifted the burden of proof regarding intent to McKenzie. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at
1491 (citing McKenzie, 608 P.2d at 458-59).
22. [d. at 1491 (citing McKenzie, 608 P.2d at 457-59). The Montana Supreme
Court held that this error was harmless because "the evidence on the issue of
intent [was] overwhelming, uncontradicted, and permitted but one rational conclusion." [d. (quoting McKenzie, 608 P.2d at 458-59).
23. McKenzie v. Montana, 449 U.S. at 1050 (1980) (citations omitted).
24. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1491.
25. [d.
26. [d. (citing McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519, 1520 (9th Cir. 1986». Following this decision, a number of judges voted to hear the case en bane. By a
seven to four vote, this en bane court affirmed the decision, stating that the giving
of the unconstitutional jury instructions constituted harmless error. [d. (citing
Risley, 801 F.2d at 1530-32).
27. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1995). The prosecutor
claimed that he and the judge did not discuss McKenzie's possible sentencing.
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McKenzie filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus with
the Montana Supreme Court, arguing that this ex parte meeting violated his due process rights. 28 On March 3, 1987, the
United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed McKenzie's second petition in an unpublished opinion. 29
McKenzie appealed the district court's dismissal to the
Ninth Circuit which remanded the petition to the federal district court for an evidentiary hearing. 3o In 1992, the district
court denied the petition in another unpublished order. 31 On
June 24, 1994, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal by a 2-1 vote, holding that
McKenzie had the burden of proving what took place at the ex
parte meeting between the judge and prosecutor.32
D. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PuNISHMENT - THIRD PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On March 27, 1995, after the denial of McKenzie's second
habeas petition, a Montana state district court scheduled
McKenzie's execution for May 10, 1995. 33 McKenzie appealed
to the Montana Supreme Court, claiming for the first time that
Montana's twenty-one year delay in carrying out his execution
violated the Eighth Amendment. 34 On April 11, 1995, the
However, he admitted that they may have talked about the victim, the
community's feeling about the case, and McKenzie's defenses. See McKenzie v.
Risley, 915 F.2d 1396, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1990).
28. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1492. McKenzie based his argument on a Supreme
Court case, "which held that 'it is a denial of due process for a trial judge to
impose the death penalty on the basis of information which was not disclosed and
which the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain.'" Id. (quoting Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)).
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing McKenzie v. Risley, 915 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990)). The
Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to decide whether the prosecutor and
sentencing judge had discussed any matters that may have influenced the judge in
his sentencing. However, before any evidentiary hearing took place, the prosecutor
died and the record of his testimony regarding the ex parte meeting could not be
found. See id.
31. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1492.
32. Id. The majority admitted that the outcome of this appeal "turned on who
would bear the burden of proving what happened at the ex parte meeting." Id.
33. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995).
34. Id. at 1493. McKenzie based this claim on the Eighth Amendment's protec-
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Montana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. 35
On April 18, 1995, McKenzie filed his third petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court of Montana,
claiming that carrying out his execution at that late date
would violate the Eighth Amendment. 36 Two days later, the
district court dismissed this third habeas petition as being
"meritless as a successive and repetitive petition. "37
On April 24, 1995, McKenzie appealed the federal district
court's dismissal to the Ninth Circuit.3s One week later, he
filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit to stay his execution. 39
The Ninth Circuit issued a certificate of probable cause and
ordered expedited briefing and argument. 40

tion against cruel and unusual punishment. The Ninth Circuit referred to
McKenzie's claim as a "Lackey claim" because a similar contention was raised by
Clarence Allen Lackey in Lackey v. Texas. [d. (citing Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct.
1421 (1995». McKenzie also claimed on appeal that the sentencing violated the ex
post {acto law because he was sentenced under a 1981 statute that "limited the
judge's discretion in imposing a sentence other than death." [d. at 1492.
35. [d. at 1492-93.
36. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1493. In addition to claiming a violation of his
rights under the Eighth Amendment, McKenzie raised seven other claims, including: (1) changes made to Montana's capital punishment scheme since his conviction
violated the ex post {acto clause; (2) changes in the method of execution violated
the ex post {acto clause; (3) he was denied due process because he was not given
an opportunity to consult with counsel before choosing his method of execution; (4)
he was denied due process by the state's failure to consider new evidence in mitigation of his sentence; (5) he was denied due process by the state's refusal to reweigh the proportionality of his sentence in light of the reversal of convictions to
which his crime had been compared; (6) his execution would violate the Eighth
Amendment because he would be the first person executed in Montana since 1943
and the only person executed under the pre-1977 death penalty statute; and (7)
his death sentence was based on inaccurate facts because changes in the law
would now allow him to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. [d. at 1463-64.
37. [d. The court failed to discuss the merits of McKenzie's Eighth Amendment
claim. [d. at 1473.
38. [d. at 1473.
39. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1472.
40. [d. at 1464.
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III. BACKGROUND

A. INTERPRETING THE PuNISHMENT CLAUSE
Ratified in 1791, the Eighth Amendment states,
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.,,41 Prior
to 1958, only a handful of cases addressed whether a punishment would be considered cruel and unusua1. 42 The Supreme
Court first interpreted the "cruel and unusual" language of the
punishment clause43 in Wilkerson v. Utah. 44 The Court refused to "define with exactness the extent of the constitutional
provision," but found it safe to affirm that the amendment
forbids unnecessary cruelty and torture. 45
Eleven years later, the Court affirmed Wilkerson. 46 The
Court held that punishments involving burning at the stake,
crucifIXion, or breaking on the wheel violated the Eighth
Amendment. 47 However, the Court upheld death by electrocution as permissible, stating, "punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or lingering death[,] . . . something inhumane
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment
of life.,,48

41. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
42. See e.g., In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1890), overruled by Trimble v. State, 478 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1984); McElvaine v.
Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
43. The language, "nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" is commonly
referred to as the punishment clause. See generally Jonathan A. VoId, Note: The
Eighth Amendment "Punishment" Clause After Helling v. McKinney: Four Terms,
Two Standards, and a Search For Definition, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 215 (1994).
44. 99 U.S. 130 (1878), overruled by Trimble v. State, 478 A.2d 1143 (Md.
1984). The issue in Wilkerson was whether the sentence of public execution by
shooting violated the· Eighth Amendment. See id. at 132-33.
45. Id. at 135-36. The Court listed several forms of prohibited punishments
which involved different types of torture. The Court held that being dragged to a
hanging site, beheading, and public dissecting violated the punishment clause,
while death by shooting did not. See id. at 135-37.
46. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (Petitioner claimed that death by
electrocution violated the Eighth Amendment.).
47. Id. at 446.
48. Id. at 447. The Court noted that execution generally is not cruel within
the meaning of the words of the Constitution. Id.
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In 1910, in Weems v. United States,49 the Supreme Court
again refused to define with exactness the punishment clause,
but stated that the clause "is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice."so Attempting to further define the clause,
the Court listed a number of factors courts should consider
when resolving an Eighth Amendment claim.s1 The Court focused on the nature of the crime, the purpose of the law, the
length of the sentence, and the proportion of the penalty as
applied in similar cases, considering the crime and the defendant. s2 Additionally, the Court noted that "there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation."s3
In 1958, the Supreme Court emphasized the inherent
flexibility in the words "cruel and unusual."S4 The Court explained that the Amendment must draw its meaning from the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."s5 Chief Justice Warren stated that the fundamental doctrine of the Eighth Amendment "is nothing less
than the dignity of man."56
While the objective "evolving standards of decency" retains
its vitality as a principle governing Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court has continued to further define the Eighth
Amendment. 57 In Gregg v. Georgia,58 the Court stated that
49. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weems' sentence consisted of fIfteen years of hard
labor in ankle chains, perpetual surveillance, and loss of his civil rights. The
Court found that this punishment violated the "cruel and unusual punishment"
clause. See id. at 351.
50. [d. at 378.
51. See generally, Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-82.
52. [d.
53. [d. at 372.
54. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). In Trop, the Court reviewed revoking the citizenship of a native-born American who had escaped from
an Army stockade and deserted for a day. The Court concluded that loss of citizenship violated the Eighth Amendment. [d. at 86-87.
55. [d. at 101.
56. [d. at 100.
57. See Richard E. Shugrue, "A Fate Worse Than Death" - An Essay on Whether Long Times On Death Row Are Cruel Times, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 12
(1995).
58. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-69 (1976). The Court decided that allowing states to impose capital punishment for murder convictions did not violate
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although an analysis of contemporary values concerning a
challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
Amendment, it is not conclusive. 59 The Supreme Court decided that courts must also "look to objective indicia that reflect
the public attitude toward a given sanction" by considering
whether the punishment is subjectively excessive. 60 For a
punishment to be excessive it must either involve unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain or be grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime. 61
Recent Supreme Court decisions use both subjective and
objective standards to review allegations of Eighth Amendment
violations.62 The Eighth Amendment prohibits not only eighteenth century concepts of cruelty, but also those practices
deemed cruel and unusual by contemporary standards. 63
B. INORDINATE DELAYS IN CARRYING OUT EXECUTIONS
The Supreme Court ruled that capital punishment, itself,
does not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 54 The Court has also stated that the penalty of
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment. 65
Lengthy incarceration on death row is a punishment apart
from the death penalty itself.
Many prisoners on death row currently argue that extended incarceration on death row violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-

the Eighth Amendment per se. Id. at 176-78.
59. Id. at 173.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Court also noted that the judiciary still owed a certain amount of
deference to legislators who assigned the punishments for crimes. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 174-76.
62. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1993). The Court
held that the Eighth Amendment applies to conditions of confinement but violations require proof of a subjective component and this component does not vitiate
the objective component in Eighth Amendment analysis. See also Furman v. Geor·
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (listing four different
theories under which a punishment may be considered cruel and unusual).
63. Shugrue, supra note 57, at 12-13.
64. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (1976).
65. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1990).
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ment. 66 This claim is not novel; various forms of this issue
have previously been considered by the courtS. 67
In 1960, the Ninth Circuit considered Caryl Chessman's
claim that he should not be executed because he has been on
death row for eleven and one-half years, thus he has been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. 68 Chief Judge
Richard H. Chambers, rejecting Chessman's claim, stated, "I do
not see how we can offer life as a prize for one who can stall
the processes for a given number of years, especially when in
the end it appears the prisoner never really had any good
points."69
In 1984, the u.s. District Court for the District of Utah
rejected a similar Eighth Amendment claim.70 The petitioner
raised a cruel and unusual punishment claim based on the
repeated setting and staying of execution dates. 71 In rejecting
this claim, the court held that to accept petitioner's argument
would create an irreconcilable conflict between constitutional
guarantees and would create a mockery out of the justice system. 72
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit considered a comparable Eighth
Amendment claim. 73 The claimant argued that fulfilling his
sentence after sixteen years on death row would constitute

66. See, e.g., Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2603 (1995) (claimed cruel and unusual punishment by executing him after
forcing him to endure over a decade on death row). See also Stafford v. Oklahoma,
899 P.2d 657 (Okla. Crim. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995) (claim that
prolonged incarceration on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
67. See Stafford, 899 P.2d at 657, and McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463
(9th Cir. 1995) (referring to this claim as a Lackey claim). See also infra notes 6885 and accompanying text.
68. Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960).
69. [d.
70. Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984), affd, 802 F.2d
1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 919 (1988).
71. [d.
72. [d. at 431.
73. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds,
506 U.S. 40 (1992). Although this case was reversed on other grounds in 1992, the
law of the circuit was that no Eighth Amendment claim existed. See McKemie v.
Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995).
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cruel and unusual punishment. 74 The Ninth Circuit rejected
the claim, stating "[a] defendant must not be penalized for
pursuing his constitutional rights, but he also should not be
able to benefit from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of
those rights.,,75
In evaluating Eighth Amendment violations, the Supreme
Court also has considered objective evidence of international
community values. 76 Since 1986, foreign courts have developed a line of precedent which could support a conclusion different from that reached by United States courts; a conclusion
that evolving standards of decency call for a closer examination
of this issue. 77 In 1989, the European Commission on Human
Rights concluded "lengthy delays in executing death sentences
in the United States make the death penalty inhuman or degrading treatment.... "78 Other foreign courts have considered whether lengthy delays in executing a prisoner constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 79 In 1993, a British
court held that to execute two inmates who had spent fourteen
years on death row and who had been read execution warrants
three times would constitute torture or inhumane or degrading
punishment. 80 The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe prohibited
the execution of two inmates who had been on death row for

74. Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1491.
75. [d. at 1491-92.
76. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & nn. 31, 34 (1988)
(relying on Western European and Anglo-American opinion and practices to hold
that assessing death penalty against juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
77. See generally McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1487 and Justice Norris' dissent discussing Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 489 (1989), Pratt & Morgan
v. Attorney General for Jamaica, 3 SLR 995 (Privy Council 1993), and Catholic
Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney General, No. SC 73, reported in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. (1993). Our humanity gives rise to "an instinctive revulsion against the prospect of hanging a man after he has been held under sentence
of death for many years." [d. (quoting Pratt & Morgan, 3 SLR at 16).
78. Brief for Appellant at 24 (quoting Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 489) (forbidding the extradition of persons charged with capital crimes from Europe to the
United States). McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1488.
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1488 (quoting Pratt & Morgan, 3 SLR at 995). "This
decision did not involve an interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 - the source of the Eighth Amendment. . . ." but the Privy Council did survey English common law and conclude
that these "practices were condoned historically at common law." [d.
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four to six years, claiming that prolonged death row incarceration constituted inhuman or degrading punishment. sl
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court, in Lackey v.
Texas, addressed whether an inordinate delay in carrying out
an execution violated the Eighth Amendment. s2 Lackey questioned whether executing a prisoner who had already spent
seventeen years on death row violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. S3 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Justice Stevens issued a memorandum stating the Court would
postpone its consideration until other courts had addressed the
issue. s4 Justice Stevens' memorandum stated:
[T]he death penalty serves 'two principal social
purposes: retribution and deterrence'.85 It is
arguable that neither ground retains any force
for prisoners who have spent some seventeen
years under a sentence of death. [W]hen the
death penalty 'ceases realistically to further
these purposes, its imposition would then be the
pointless and needless extinction of life with
only marginal contributions to any discernible
social or public purposes. A penalty with such
negligible returns to the State would be patently
excessive and cruel and unusual punishment
violative of the Eighth Amendment.'86

The Court remanded Lackey to the district court for further
consideration of the Eighth Amendment claim.s7

81. [d. at 1488 (quoting Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v.
Attorney General, No. SC. 73, reported in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 323 (1993». In reaching this decision, the court considered the "physical conditions" and the "mental
anguish" endured by prisoners on death row. [d.
82. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-23 (1995).
83. [d.
84. [d. at 1422.
85. [d. at 1421 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
86. [d. at 1421-22 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972».
87. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421. The district court stayed the execution on the
basis that reasonable jurists would disagree on the application of the abuse-of-thewrit doctrine and the merits of Lackey's claim. However, the Fifth Circuit vacated
the stay holding that the non-retroactivity doctrine barred his claim.
Lackey v.
Texas, 52 F.3d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1995). Reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court again granted a stay of execution. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1818 (1995).
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C. CONDITIONS ON DEATH Row

Habeas petitions assert that to execute a petitioner after
he or she has spent years on death row under torturous conditions would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 88 Petitioners argue
that death row conditions invoke the protection of the Eighth
Amendment because they violate evolving standards of decency.89
One study of death row inmates documented the conditions on death rows and the effects of these conditions on
death row inmates. 9o This study revealed that the majority of
death row inmates are unable to work at prison jobs, attend
education classes or religious services, participate in clubs, and
have much less opportunity for exercise and recreation. 91
Moreover, most have little human contact and are confined to
their cells over 22 hours a day.92 They eat in their cells and
are separated from visitors by barriers.93 An inmate described
his experience on death row. 94 He described other inmates
throwing feces from their cells; prisoners chained to their beds
and lying in their own waste, and the availability of a single
shower for 26 inmates which is "filthy, covered with human
waste, frequently stopped up and shared by those with communicable diseases".95 Richard Strafer, an appellate law fellow,
noted: "Apparently abandoned by the living, the condemned

88. See, e.g., Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421-22 (1995); Free v. Peters,
50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Chrans, 50 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir. 1995).
89. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
90. See G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency,
Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 860, 870 n.37 (1983) (quoting W. Nagel, DEATH HOUSE SURVEY,
(1979».
91. Id.
92. Id.
93.Id.
94. Laura LaFay, 15 Years on Death Row Willie Lloyd Turner Has Been on
Death Row Longer Than Anyone Else In Modern-Day Virginia History. In An Appeal Filed This Week, His Lawyer Says That Turner Has Been Punished Enough,
THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, April 28, 1995 at AI.
95.Id.
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are subjected to massive deprivations of personal autonomy on
death row."96
For many years, courts and medical experts have acknowledged the dehumanizing effect of death row conditions on prisoners. 97 In 1972, the California Supreme Court, concluding
that capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment's
punishment clause98 , stated:
The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only
in the execution.... but also in the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to
execution. . . . Penologists and medical experts
agree that the process of carrying out a verdict
of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to
the human spirit as to constitute psychological
torture ....99

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts elaborated on such notions: "Punishment is cruel when it involves 'a lingering
death'''.l°O Since death sentences will ... be carried out only
after agonizing months and years of uncertainty, the punishment is cruel and unusual.,,101
Justice Frankfurter once recognized that prisoners who
experience insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence are not rare. 102 In another case,103 Justice Brennan
acknowledged "that mental pain is an inseparable part of our
practice of punishing criminals by death, for the prospect of
pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable
long wait between the imposition of the sentence and the actu-

96. Strafer, supra note 90 at 74.
97. See Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row Con·
fineTTumt, 5 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 141, 157·161 (1979); Gallemore & Parton,
Inmate Response to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167
(1972).
98. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972).
99. Anderson, 493 P.2d at 894-95.
100. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E. 2d 1274 (Mass.
1980) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890».
101. Id.
102. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950), reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 926
(1950), overruled by Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538 (11th Cir. 1984).
103. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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al infliction of death."I04 Psychiatrists and psychologists, legal
commentators and authors, and prison wardens, have all
shared in the opinion that prisoners on death row live in torturous conditions. 105
In sum, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth
Amendment's punishment clause "may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.,,106
Further, the Court stated that the Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.107 Considering the results of
death row studies, as well as court decisions, Justice Stevens
and Justice Breyer agreed that whether an inordinate delay in
carrying out an execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is an important question and is sufficient to warrant
review by courts. 108
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION

In McKenzie v. Day,I09 the majority addressed two separate issues posed by McKenzie. 110 First, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed McKenzie's appeal from the district court's dismissal
of the petition for habeas corpus. III Second, it addressed
104. Id. at 288-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., Strafer, supra note 90, at 74; Note, Mental Suffering Under the
Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 57 IOWA L. REV. 814, 826-31
(1972); Schabas, Execution Delayed, Execution Denied, 5 CRIM. L. FORUM 180
(1994); Mello, Facing Death Alone, 37 AMER. L. REV. 513, 552 (1989); Stafer, Symposium on Death Penalty Issue: Volunteering For Execution, 74 J. CRIM. L. 860,
861 (1983); Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 141, 157-61 (1979); Gallemore & Parton,
Inmate Response to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167
(1972); C. DUFFY & A HIRSHBERG, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN (1962). A former warden at San Quentin stated: "One night on death row is too long, and the length of
time spent there constitutes cruelty that defies the imagination. It has always
been a source of wonder to me that they didn't all go stark raving mad." Id. at
254.
106. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
107. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
108. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421.
109. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995).
110. Id. at 1464.
111. Id. McKenzie sought a stay and a remand to the district court for consid-
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McKenzie's alternative request for the court to issue a writ of
habeas corpus based on the merits of his Lackey claim. 112
1. The Stay

The Ninth Circuit restated the Supreme Court's holding
that a "court may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable
relief."113 The majority concluded that McKenzie, like the petitioner in Gomez v. United States District Court for the
Northern District of California,114 raised claims that should
have been brought much earlier in the legal proceedings. 115
The majority reasoned that there was a strong presumption
against granting a stay created by McKenzie's delay in raising
his claim. 116 According to the court, raising the claim six
weeks prior to his execution was abusive. 117

a. Timing the Stay Request
The Ninth Circuit recognized that McKenzie's stay request
rested on his claim that the 20 year delay in carrying out his
execution constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 11s The
court noted that a 1960 Ninth Circuit case119 resolved a similar claim and another holding 120 30 years later addressed
McKenzie's argument exactly.121 Since the Ninth Circuit had
already addressed this claim, McKenzie could have raised the

eration of his Eighth Amendment claim. [d.
112. [d. By ruling on the merits, the Ninth Circuit would bypass the equitable
considerations. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470.
113. [d. at 1464 (quoting Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of
Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992». The Supreme Court in Gomez denied the request for
stay of execution due to the "abusive delay" in bringing the claim. [d. (citing
Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653-54).
114. 503 U.S. 653 (1992). This was the famous case of Robert Alton Harris.
McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464.
115. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464.
116. [d. at 1467.
117. [d.
118. See id. at 1465.
119. Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960).
120. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990).
121. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465.
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issue as early as his first or second federal habeas petitions. 122
The majority acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit had
rejected precisely this claim in 1990/23 McKenzie would arguably have been frivolous in raising it. l24 However, the court
determined that McKenzie could have raised the claim prior to
the Ninth Circuit's rejection in 1990, or after the court vacated
its decision in 1993. 125 The majority noted that had McKenzie
raised the issue at either of these times, the court could have
considered his claim without having to vacate a death warrant. 126 Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded that McKenzie
offered no reasonable excuse for failing to raise this issue earlier except for his claim that his counsel believed it would be
unsuccessful. 127 However, the majority pointed out that this
fact did not stop a petitioner from raising it in 1984,128 or another from asserting this claim in 1995. 129 Therefore, the majority concluded that McKenzie should have raised his Eighth
Amendment claim earlier.130

122. See Uf. The majority points out that McKenzie could have moved to amend
his first petition prior to it being resolved in the district court. Id. at 1464 n.6.
123. Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1473. This decision was vacated in 1993. Richmond
v. Lewis, 986 F.2d 1583 (9th Cir. 1993).
124. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465. The court said "arguably" because "so long as
the claim was not finally addressed by the Supreme Court, a death row inmate
would have been well within his rights in raising the issue to preserve it for Supreme Court review." Id. at n.8.
125. Id. The majority noted that in 1990 McKenzie had been on death row for
fifteen years, almost the same amount of time that Lackey had been on death row
when he first raised the same argument. Id. at 1465.
126. Id. When a court vacates a death warrant, the existing death warrant
becomes void. Then if the petitioner is unsuccessful in his habeas petition the
court has to re-issue a new death warrant setting a new date and time. See generally, Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
127. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465. Counsel for McKenzie explained that he refused to raise "frivolous claims, not only because such conduct is sanctionable, but
also because he considers respect for the court to be paramount." Id. at 1475.
128. Id. at 1465. See Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1491-92. Richmond claimed that
fulfillment of his sentence after so many years on death row would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1480.
129. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421 (1995). See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
130. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464.
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b. Preliminary Consideration on the Merits
Next, the Ninth Circuit gave McKenzie's claim preliminary
consideration. 13l The court reasoned that a strong showing of
success on the merits might, on rare occasions, outweigh abusive delay in raising the claim. 132
The court began its consideration of the merits by referring to Richmond v. Lewis,133 in which the Ninth Circuit stated that a petitioner must not be penalized for asserting his
constitutional rights, but he should not benefit from the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit of those rights. 134 Applying this
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit claimed that the delay has been
caused by McKenzie availing himself of the procedures provided to ensure that executions are carried out only in appropriate cases. 135 The court concluded that delays due to procedures created to prevent cruel and unusual punishment could
not alone violate the Eighth Amendment. 136

c. Policy Behind Not Sustaining the Eighth Amendment Claim
The court recognized that sustaining McKenzie's Eighth
Amendment claim would greatly affect procedures regarding
capital punishment. 137 The court explained that stays are
frequently granted because a state is not permanently deprived
of carrying out the punishment.13s The majority held that
sustaining McKenzie's unconstitutional delay claim would put
states at the risk of not being able to enforce their sentenc-

131. [d. at 1466.
132. [d.
133. 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990).
134. Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1491-92.
135. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-67.
136. See id. at 1467. "[O]ne who is sentenced to death need not have excessive
review, ... but the constitutional mandate of adequate review requires strict
adherence. To provide less renders the death penalty cruel and unusual." [d. at
n.12 (quoting Deutscher v. Whitley, 991 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1993)).
137. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
138. [d.
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es. 139 The Ninth Circuit feared that death row inmates could
avoid their sentences by drawing out the appeals process and
thereby prevent the state from carrying out its sentence. l40
Following this reasoning, the court feared that the administration of death penalty cases under pressure to avoid delays
would emphasize speed instead of accuracy.l4l
Finally, the majority stated that even if the court decided
that McKenzie's claim constituted cruel and unusual punishment, commutation of the death penalty was an improper
remedy.142 The court reasoned that McKenzie's years of suffering could not be undone, nor would commutation of the
death penalty relieve the pain of others in similar situations. l43
In deciding whether to grant equitable relief, the majority,
after weighing the State's strong interest in proceeding with its
sentence and considering the last-minute nature of an application to stay the execution, concluded that McKenzie's Eighth
Amendment claim should have been raised earlier. l44 Further, the majority concluded that it was highly unlikely that
McKenzie's claim would be successful if litigated on its merits. l45 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit denied McKenzie's request
for the court to remand the case to the district court and issue
a stay.l46

139. [d.
140. [d.
141. [d. The court noted that almost 1700 out of 5000 people have received
some kind of relief from capital punishment, and implied that this figure would be
severely affected if the court emphasized speed as compared to accuracy. McKenzie,
57 F.3d at 1467 n.13 (quoting BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Capital Punishment
1993, at 12).
142. [d. at 1467.
143. [d. The Ninth Circuit noted that when other prisoners complain of prison
conditions, they correct the conditions; they do not reduce their sentences. [d.
144. Id. at 1468 (quoting Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653).
145. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
146. [d. at 1469. The majority further stated that the court was unable to
grant McKenzie's request for a stay based on any of his other claims. Again, the
majority expressed that the claims should have been raised at an earlier time or
were completely without merit. [d.
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2. Stay Motion Made Directly To the Court

The Ninth Circuit also denied McKenzie's request to directly issue the writ based on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. 147 The opinion reiterated that the merits of
McKenzie's Eighth Amendment claim were highly questionable. l48 The majority stated that delays due to procedures
created to prevent cruel and unusual punishment could not
violate the Eighth Amendment. 149 The court expressed fear
that sustaining the Eighth Amendment claim would emphasize
speed instead of accuracy in death penalty cases. 150 The court
ultimately held that even if the delay did constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, commutation of the death penalty was
not the proper remedy. 151 Therefore, the court explained its
reluctance to grant the equivalent of summary judgment. 152
The court refused to further examine the merits of McKenzie's
claim and declined to order the writ. 153
B. THE DISSENT
1. The District Court's Failure to Follow Proper Procedures

In his dissent, Judge Norris addressed the majority's failure to properly address McKenzie's appeal of the district
court's dismissal of the writ.1S4 He asserted that the district
court erred in finding that McKenzie's claims were "successive. "155 The dissent explained that the district court should
have applied abuse of writ doctrine procedures as mandated by

147. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470. McKenzie claimed that the long delay in carrying out his sentence, independent of any other claims, proved that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. [d.
148. [d.
149. [d. at 1467.
150. [d.
151. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. See also supra note 143.
152. [d. at 1470.
153. [d.
154. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1470 (9th Cir. 1995).
155. [d. (citing Campbell v. Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Norris stated that a claim is considered "successive" only if it has been raised in
a previous petition. [d. at 1472. Judge Norris pointed out that this was
McKenzie's first time raising the Eighth Amendment violation claim. [d. at 1470.
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the Supreme Court.156 Further, the dissent argued that the
Ninth Circuit should have reversed the dismissal, remanded
the case to the district court, and ordered the court to follow
the proper procedures. 157 Instead of following the proper procedures, the majority took no action on the appeal of the dismissal. 158 "Nonetheless, the majority has paradoxically decided that because McKenzie did not bring his claim earlier, his
potentially meritorious petition will be mooted by his potentially unconstitutional execution. »159
2. The Majority's Misinterpretation of Gomez
The dissent criticized the majority's gross misinterpretation and misapplication of the holding from Gomez. 160 Judge
Norris argued that Gomez provided a rule of very narrow application which extended the abuse of writ doctrine. 161 Judge
Norris contended that the majority interpreted Gomez as turning on the single fact of inexcusable delay; however, he insisted
that courts may properly refuse to grant a stay only to petitioners who at the last-minute, attempt to manipulate the
judicial process. 162 Judge Norris explained that the punitive
156. [d. at 1472 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991), reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1224 (1991»). The abuse of writ doctrine should be applied to a
claim raised for the first time in a subsequent petition:
When a prisoner files a second or subsequent application,
the government bears the burden of pleading abuse of the
writ. . . . To excuse his failure to raise the claim earlier,
petitioner must show cause for failing to raise it. . . . If
petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the
claim may nonetheless be excused if he can show that a
fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a
failure to entertain the claim.
McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95.
157. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470. Judge Norris reasoned "at that point the district court would still have had time to call a scheduling conference to arrange an
expedited hearing on the petition's motion for a stay, permitting the State to raise
abuse of the writ and allowing the petitioner to demonstrate cause and prejudice
or miscarriage of justice in a manner mandated by McCleskey." [d. at 1474. Norris
also emphasized that counsel for Mr. McKenzie was first confronted by Gomez at
oral argument and was required to respond without preparation nor briefing. [d.
at 1471.
158. [d. at 1474.
159. [d. at 1475.
160. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1474-80 (citing Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct.
for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992)).
161. See id. at 1476-77.
162. [d. at 1477. See Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653. Norris claimed that the "lan-
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holding of Gomez, refusal to consider a proper claim that may
save a petitioner's life, has never been considered appropriate
except when the petitioner has completely failed to present
even a "semblance of a reasonable excuse for the inordinate
delay."l63
Judge Norris noted that two facts led the Gomez court to
find that defendant's petition was a last minute effort to manipulate the judicial process. l64 First, the petitioner in Gomez
sought a stay a mere three days before his scheduled execution. 165 Second, the petitioner in Gomez sought a stay of execution through a class action under § 1983, rather than
through a habeas petition in a blatant attempt to avoid application of the abuse of the writ doctrine. 166
3. Petitioner Did Not Attempt to Manipulate the Judicial
Process
Judge Norris found that once the court properly applied
the Gomez holding to rest on petitioners who try to manipulate
the judicial process, it would find that the Gomez rule is inapplicable to McKenzie. 167 First, he argued that McKenzie's petition for a stay was not a last minute effort to stay his execution. 16s McKenzie brought this claim more than six and a half
weeks prior to his scheduled execution, as compared to the
Gomez petitioner who raised his claim only three days before
he was scheduled to die. 169 Second, Montana neither accused

guage of manipulation is not accidental, but rather points to the central facts
upon which the case turned." McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. Norris also noted that
no other circuit has read Gomez to apply as broadly as the majority suggested.
See id. at 1478.
163. ld. at 1476 (citing Herrera v. Collins, ll3 S. Ct. at 874 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring». In Herrera, the petitioner presented new evidence eight years after
his conviction without offering any excuse for this delay. Herrera, ll3 S. Ct.. at
874.
164. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1477.
165. ld.
166. ld. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a civil rights action against a state actor for deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
167. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1477.
168. ld.
169. ld.
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McKenzie of attempting to manipulate the judicial process nor
brought forward any proof to support this allegation. 170 Arguing that the majority should not have classified McKenzie's
petition as a last-minute application, Judge Norris found that
McKenzie had good cause for not raising his claim earlier, and
therefore did not file his petition in an attempt to manipulate
the judicial process. 171
Judge Norris noted that through the early 1990s, every
Ninth Circuit case involving a claim similar to McKenzie's had
been flatly rejected by the Ninth Circuit.172 The dissent conceded that other cases raised this claim, but noted that these
other cases still lacked any positive precedent to rely upon. 173
Norris insisted that McKenzie's failure to assert this previously rejected claim did not demonstrate that McKenzie was trying to manipulate the judicial process. 174
Judge Norris further explained that, until March of 1995,
McKenzie had no basis to believe that his Eighth Amendment
claim might be successful. 175 Judge Norris pointed out that
McKenzie raised his Eighth Amendment claim following the
Supreme Court's decision to grant a stay of execution in Lackey
v. Texas. 176 Additionally, Judge Norris noted that McKenzie's
first positive authority supporting his unconstitutional delay
claim did not come until March 27, 1995, when Justice Stevens
published a memorandum on the viability of this claim. 177

170. [d. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
171. [d. at 1479.

172. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d at 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1990); Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960).
173. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1480.
174. [d. at 1480-81. Norris insisted that McKenzie raising his Lackey claim for
the frrst time six weeks before his execution, cannot by itself justify finding
McKenzie guilty of engaging in a last minute attempt to manipulate the judicial
process. [d. at 1480. In addition, "[t]he fact that the claim was not completely
unheard of, and had been raised in three or four cases . . . at the state or district
court level, is not sufficient to show that counsel engaged in manipulative behavior...." [d. at 1481.
175. [d. at 1480-81.
176. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1480-81 (citing Lackey, 115 S. Ct. 1274 (1995». The
Supreme Court issued the stay while deciding whether to grant certiorari on
Lackey's Eighth Amendment violation claim. The dissent claimed that this indicated to McKenzie that this claim was "advancing." [d. at 1480.
177. [d. at 1481 (citing Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421).
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Judge Norris pointed out that this was the exact day McKenzie
first asserted his unconstitutional delay claim. 178
Finally, Judge Norris argued that, unlike the petitioner in
Gomez, McKenzie's claim could possibly depict him as being
innocent of the death penalty.179 McKenzie argued that the
substantial delay and harsh conditions on death row have
made him ineligible for execution pursuant to the Eighth
Amendment. lso If he prevailed on this claim, McKenzie could
have shown that he should not be executed. 181
In conclusion, the dissent explained that the proper interpretation of Gomez does not support the majority's holding that
McKenzie's Eighth Amendment claim was a last minute attempt to manipulate the judicial process. 182 Gomez should not
deny McKenzie the chance to have his petition properly considered on remand to the district court. 183
4. The Stay
The dissent next addressed the issue of whether the Ninth
Circuit should have issued a stay pending consideration of the
petition by the district court on remand. l84 The dissent referred to the proper standard for granting a stay set forth by
the Supreme Court: a court should grant a stay only if the
claim presents substantial grounds upon which relief might be
granted. ls5 Further, the dissent noted that there is a strong
equitable presumption for granting stays of execution to permit

178. Id.
179. Id. at 1478.
180. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1478.
18l. Id. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031
(1989). "[TJhe term 'innocence of the death penalty' is equally appropriate to describe a defendant who has been declared ineligible for such punishment based on
facts arising after trial." Id. at 1479.
182. Id. at 1479-80.
183. Id. at 1482.
184. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1482.
185. Id. (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). The dissent in Barefoot
elaborated that "substantial grounds" includes claims that are "debatable among
jurists of reason or are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893.
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full consideration of habeas petitions. 186 The dissent argued
that McKenzie's Eighth Amendment unconstitutional delay
claim meets the standard expressed by the Supreme Court and
a stay should have been granted pending the remanded decision. 187
5. The Eighth Amendment Claim
The dissent noted that Justice Stevens addressed
McKenzie's Eighth Amendment claim in his memorandum
respecting the denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas. l88 Justice Stevens' memorandum stated that neither retribution nor
deterrence serves any purpose for prisoners who have spent
over 17 years on death row. 189 The dissent argued that executing a prisoner after such a long delay would be pointless
and that it would have "only marginal contributions to any
discernible social or public purposes."190 The dissent summed
up Justice Stevens' memorandum by stating a penalty with
such insignificant returns to the State would be excessively
cruel and unusual and would violative the Eighth Amendment. l9l
The dissent argued that McKenzie presented a strong case
that his execution would not further the two principal social
purposes - retribution and deterrence - that justify capital
punishment. 192 The dissent asserted that his delay, coupled
with confinement under the harsh and punitive conditions on
death row, satisfied the retribution interest. 193 Further, the
dissent insisted that the additional deterrent effect of executing McKenzie was nil due to the time that has passed since he
was sentenced; because no one in Montana has been executed

186. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1476.
187. Id. at 1482. The dissent also claims that McKenzie's ex post facto claim
would also meet this standard. Id. at 1482.
188. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1484 (citing Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421).
189. Id. at 1484-85 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890».
190. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972».
191. Id. at 1485 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972)).
192. Id. at 1486.
193. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1486.
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since 1943, and no one has been sentenced to death under
McKenzie's sentencing statute. 19'
The dissent further maintained that McKenzie's argument
has gained additional strength from recent decisions in foreign
COurtS. 195 First, the dissent pointed to a recent decision by the
Privy Council of the British House of Lords. 196 The Privy
Council held that to execute a prisoner who had been on death
row for fourteen years would constitute torture or inhuman or
degrading punishment. 197 The dissent also mentioned a case
decided by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 198 where the
court prohibited the execution of a prisoner who had been sentenced six years before, claiming that it was inhuman or degrading punishment. 199
The dissent concluded its discussion of whether to grant a
stay by arguing that McKenzie's unconstitutional delay claim
is "substantial, important, and deserving of careful and
thoughtful adjudication."20o ffitimately, the dissent urged
that the only proper remedy in this case would be to vacate the
district court's order, remand the case to the district court, and
stay the execution. 201

194. Id. at 1486-87.
195. Id. at 1487. The dissent recognized that the foreign decisions do not directly address the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.
However, the dissent noted that the Privy Council surveyed common law and
"concluded that extended imprisonment on death row and the repeated setting of
execution dates were not practices condoned historically at common law." Id.
196. Id. (citing Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, 3 SLR 995, 2 AC
I, 4 All ER 769 (Privy Council 1993».
197. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1487.
198. Id. at 1488 (citing Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v.
Attorney General, No. S.C. 73 (Zimb. June 24, 1993».
199. Id. (citing Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, No. S.C. at
4-5). In reaching its conclusion, the court also considered the physical conditions
and mental anguish. Id.
200. Id. (Norris, J., dissenting).
201. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1489. The dissent finally argued that to allow
McKenzie to die while Lackey is allowed to argue the exact same claim would be
the "antithesis of justice." Id.
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V. CRITIQUE
The Ninth Circuit misapplied Gomez 202 to McKenzie's
third petition for habeas corpus; as a result, the Ninth Circuit
did not address McKenzie's appeal from the district court's
dismissal of his petition. 203 Further, the Ninth Circuit ignored prior Supreme Courts holdings offering guidance for
evaluating Eighth Amendment claims. 204
A. THE MISAPPLICATION OF GOMEZ

The majority denied McKenzie's motion for a stay by finding Gomez applicable to McKenzie's third habeas petition. 205
The Gomez Court held that when a petitioner "resorts to lastminute attempts to manipulate the judicial process," a court
may refuse to grant equitable relief. 206
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court's suggestion that a court may consider the last-minute nature of a stay
was not elaborated in the Court's brief opinion, nor was it
developed in subsequent cases. 207 Further, the punitive
Gomez rule, refusal to consider an otherwise valid claim, has
never been applied except in cases where the petitioner failed
to show "even a semblance of a reasonable excuse for the inordinate delay.,,208 Therefore, the holding in Gomez should not

202. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653
(1992).
203. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995) and supra notes
113-46 and accompanying text.
204. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1463-70 and supra notes 42-62, 82-86 and accompanying text.
205. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1464.
206. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653,
654 (1992).
207. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1476.
208. [d. at 1477 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 426 (1995)). The
Eleventh Circuit based a decision on this principle. However, there the petitioner
offered no good reason for his six-year refusal to pursue and exhaust his state
remedies and file a federal petition. Further, the court noted that the petitioner
offered no excuse for his manipulative practice of waiting until the day of his
scheduled execution to seek relief. Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir.
1995).
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have been expanded to apply to McKenzie's petition because of
the fundamental differences between the cases. 209
The first such difference is that McKenzie's application
was not a last minute attempt. 210 The Gomez Court held that
filing a petition a mere three days before a scheduled execution
constituted a last minute attempt. 211 McKenzie, however,
filed his application over six weeks prior to his scheduled execution. 212
Second, in Gomez, the Supreme Court denied the petition
for a stay of execution by holding that it was an attempt to
manipulate the judicial process. 213 The Court explained that
the petitioner in Gomez obviously attempted to avoid application of the abuse of the writ of habeas corpus jurisprudence by
seeking a stay of execution through a § 1983 suit, rather than
through a habeas petition. 214
McKenzie did not attempt to manipulate the judicial system by filing his petition.215 He raised his Eighth Amendment claim as soon as he had a plausible basis for bringing the
claim.216 The majority argued that, even in the absence of
positive authority for the claim, McKenzie should have raised
it because it had been raised in other cases.217 However, the
Supreme Court has stated that petitioners aren't required to

209. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1476-78.
210. Id. at 1477.
211. See generally Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653.
212. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1477.
213. Gomez, 503 U.S. at 653-54.
214. McKenzie, 57 F.3d .at 1477. Three days before the petitioner in Gomez was
scheduled to be executed, a class action was filed under § 1983 claiming that
California's method of execution was unconstitutional and requested a temporary
restraining order to prevent further executions. Id.
215. See id. at 1474-79.
216. Id. at 1481. McKenzie's counsel argued that he raised the Eighth Amendment claim as soon as he learned that the Supreme Court issued a stay for Clarence Lackey. Counsel asserted that this suggested that several justices thought the
issue was one on which certiorari might be appropriate. Counsel cited to Barefoot
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983), which held that "a stay issues only if there is
reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari - - [and] a significant
possibility of reversal of the lower court's decision." See Brief for Appellant at 29.
217. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1465.
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bring all remotely plausible constitutional claims that could,
some day, gain recognition. 218 Finally, McKenzie used the
proper habeas procedures to raise his claim; he did not file a §
1983 suit. 219
Considering these factors, the majority misapplied the
holding in Gomez to deny McKenzie his appeal of the district
court's dismissal of his petition. 220
B. THE MAJORITY'S FAILURE TO APPLY THE PROPER EIGHTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

The majority deemed it prudent to give McKenzie's Eighth
Amendment claim preliminary consideration because a showing of success may outweigh any delay in raising the claim. 221
Regarding Eighth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court
has stated that the clause "is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice."222 The Supreme Court further stated that
the Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. ,,223
The majority clearly ignored the precedent set forth by the
Supreme Court and did not discuss public opinion or evolving
standards of decency.224 The majority did acknowledge that
foreign courts have held it to be cruel and unusual punishment
to execute a prisoner after an inordinate delay.225 Nevertheless, instead of interpreting these cases as an indication that
evolving standards of decency may have changed, or that pub-

218. [d. at 1481 (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984».
219. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1479.
220. See id. at 1477.
221. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir 1995).
222. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
223. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
224. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1461-70. See also supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
225. [d. at 1466. The majority refers to Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General for
Jamaica, 3 SLR 995, 2 AC 1, 4 All ER 769 (Privy Council 1993), and Catholic
Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney General, No. S.C. 73
(Zimb. June 24, 1993). [d.
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lic opinion has become enlightened by a humane justice, the
majority did not believe that view would prevail in the United
States. 226 However, the Court has traditionally examined
views of challenged punishment as expressed by objective evidence of community values, including international practices. 227 Thus, the majority did not engage in any meaningful
Eighth Amendment legal analysis. 228
The majority also blatantly ignored Justice Stevens' memorandum that directly addressed this Eighth Amendment
claim. 229 In his memorandum, Stevens stated that capital
punishment is justified because it "might serve two principal
social purposes: retribution and deterrence. It is arguable that
neither retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17
years under a sentence of death.,,230 By failing to address this
assertion, the majority chose to ignore the guidance of the
Supreme COurt. 231 McKenzie argued that his twenty-one
years on death row under harsh conditions satisfied the retribution interest. 232 In addition, McKenzie argued that since
twenty years had passed since his sentencing, and that no one
in Montana had been executed since 1943, the deterrent value
of executing him was nullified. 233 McKenzie's execution arguably would not further state interests; the majority should
have at least addressed this argument. 234
In addition to struggling with his pending execution for 21
years, McKenzie alleged that he waited under the most difficult prison conditions. 235 McKenzie has a pending federal civil
rights lawsuit alleging his long term denial of medical care. 236
226. [d.
227. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & nn. 31, 34 (1988)
(referring to international opinion and practices expressed in statutes and treaties
of Western European and Anglo-American nations in holding that the death penalty for juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
228. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-68.
229. [d. See Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421 (1995).
230. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421. Stevens also noted that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit capital punishment partly because the death penalty was considered permissible by the Framers. [d.
231. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-68.
232. [d. at 1486.
233. [d. at 1486-87.
234. [d.
235. See Brief for Appellant at 33.
236. [d. at n.14. McKenzie is the named plaintiff in McKenzie v. Chisolm, (D.
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Further, McKenzie and other maximum security inmates have
a pending action regarding beatings and deprivation of property following a prison riot, caused by systemic mismanagement
and neglect. 237 These conditions alone may have violated
McKenzie's Eighth Amendment rights. 238
The majority should have conducted a more comprehensive
analysis for it is undisputable that McKenzie's Eighth Amendment claim is important and deserves a careful and thoughtful
adjudication.239 The majority should not have applied the limited meaning of Gomez to McKenzie's third petition for habeas
cOrpUS. 240 Rather, the majority should have followed the proper procedures and remanded the case to the district court,
where the state could have raised an abuse of writ doctrine for
McKenzie's failure to raise the claim in a previous petition. 241
Further, by remanding the case and issuing a stay pending the
district court's consideration of McKenzie's Eighth Amendment
claim, the majority would have followed Justice Stevens's
statement that the importance and novelty of this issue is
sufficient to warrant review by the Supreme Court after it has
been considered by other courtS.242
VI. CONCLUSION
In McKenzie v. Day,243 the Ninth Circuit first erred by
not properly addressing McKenzie's appea1,244 The majority
then greatly expanded the holding of Gomez v. United States
District Court for the Northern District of California 245 to dismiss McKenzie's petition as a last minute attempt to manipu-

Mont.) 92-67-H-CCL. Id.
237. Id. McKenzie is a plaintiff in In re September 22, 1991 Riot, D. Mont. No.
93-19-H-LBE. Id.
238. See Brief for Appellant at 33.
239. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1488.
240. Id. at 1478.
241. Id. at 1474.
242. Lackey, 115 S. Ct. at 1421.
243. 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995).
244. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470-71. The district court erred in voluntarily
dismissing McKenzie's petition by holding that it was "successive and repetitive."
Id.
245. Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

31

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 6

72

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:41

late the judicial process. 246 Finally, the majority concluded
that McKenzie's claim that a 20-year delay in carrying out his
death sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
was not likely to succeed if litigated to its conclusion. 247 In
reaching this conclusion, the court failed to engage in any
meaningful Eighth Amendment analysis and ignored Justice
Stevens' memorandum that this issue needs to be further addressed by lower courts. 248
Although the State executed Mr. McKenzie, other death
row inmates live to pursue virtually indistinguishable Eighth
Amendment claims. 249
Amber A. Belt

246. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1479.
247. [d. at 1467.
248. See id. at 1466-68.
249. [d. at 1489. McKenzie was executed by the State of Montana on May 10,
1995. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997.
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